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Bioterrorism: Lessons Learned Since the Anthrax Mailings
ABSTRACT In the fall of 2001, Bacillus anthracis spores were spread through letters mailed in the United States. Twenty-two peo-
pleareknowntohavebeeninfected,andﬁveoftheseindividualsdied.Togetherwiththe September11attacks,thisresultedina
reevaluationoftherisksandbeneﬁtsoflifescienceresearchwiththepotentialformisuse.Inthiseditorial,wereviewsomeofthe
resultsofthesediscussionsandtheirimplicationsforthefuture.
I
t is the 10th anniversary of the mailing of the anthrax spores, a
tragic event that resulted in ﬁve deaths, seventeen other known
infections,anduntowardfearamongthepopulation.Thecleanup
is estimated to have cost $1 billion. What have we learned and
accomplished in the interim?
Of course, one cannot consider the anthrax mailings in a
vacuum, coming on the heels of the September 11 attacks on
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and United Airlines ﬂight
93. The reaction from Congress was swift: the United States
PATRIOTActwassignedintolawinOctober2001,andthePublic
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act fol-
lowed in June 2002. Together, these pieces of legislation put re-
strictionsandlimitsonwhocouldaccessandpossessselectagents,
those pathogens deemed by the CDC and USDA to be the most
dangerous.Aconsiderableamountoffundingwasalsoearmarked
for research on these pathogens.
A series of policy discussions have also ensued. The govern-
ment solicited studies from the national academies on various
topics relating to science and security, other federal advisory
panels were formed, and the government itself has addressed bio-
terrorism at various levels. Numerous nongovernmental organi-
zations throughout the world, including the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), have also engaged
scientists, security experts, ethicists, and others in an ongoing,
fruitful discussion. While the speciﬁc charge to each of these
groups differed, they all have addressed a common question: how
doweensureavibrantresearchenterprisewithoutcompromising
national security? This question is of central importance given
that the 21st century promises to be the biological century, which
will likely spawn many new life science-based technologies and
industries that will improve our lives.
The answer to this question is not straightforward, mainly be-
cause of the nature of life science research. The risks that present
themselves as a result of the acquisition of new knowledge are
difﬁcult to predict or quantify, while the potential beneﬁts are
more concrete. In addition, the results of experiments are some-
times unpredictable. Therefore, determining whether certain
typesofresearchshouldbeprohibitedorregulatedisdifﬁcult.The
consensus reached by both the scientiﬁc and national security
communities is that research should proceed, with all involved
being vigilant for the potential of misuse. The National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity, which has been charged since
2005withprovidingrecommendationstotheU.S.governmenton
the oversight and conduct of “dual use” research, has developed a
series of thoughtful reports that suggest a balanced approach to
the topic (see http://www.biosecurityboard.gov). Perhaps the
most important contribution of this body was to acknowledge
that most if not all biological research had “dual use” capabilities
while creating a special category known as “dual use research of
concern”(DURC)andthetoolstoidentifyit.Thiswasimportant
because it had the effect of walling off the small part of the scien-
tiﬁceffortthatwasmostrelevanttothethreatofbioterrorismand
thus leaving the vast majority of biological research undisturbed
and unregulated.
Another valid concern is whether certain individuals should
not be allowed to access select agents. While some groups have
nowbeenexcludedcategoricallybytheabove-mentionedstatutes,
vigorousdiscussionsconcerningpersonnelreliabilityinabroader
sense continue. Attention to an “insider threat” was ampliﬁed by
the identiﬁcation of Bruce Ivins, a scientist working in a U.S.
government laboratory, as the possible perpetrator of the anthrax
attacks. The emerging consensus is that ongoing attention to
lab workers’ trustworthiness, behavior, and attitude is the best
means to reduce the risk that someone might deliberately cause
harm.
What has the overall effect of these activities been on the life
science research enterprise? We would argue that it has been a
mixed bag. The infusion of extra research dollars has been wel-
come,especiallyatatimewhenfederalfundingofbiologyresearch
overall has suffered. Increased attention to the possible risk of
misuse may also make us safer. However, a small but signiﬁcant
number of investigators have chosen to discontinue working in
theﬁeldduetotheaddedregulatoryburden.Itisdifﬁculttoassess
how many others are not entering into this area, but anecdotal
evidencesuggeststhisisoccurringmorethanonewouldlike.Per-
haps of greater concern is that important research, such as the
development of new vaccines against anthrax, has been slowed by
the need to work within the new regulatory and statutory frame-
work. Compliance with select agent rules has signiﬁcantly in-
creased the cost of research on certain pathogens (1). The enact-
ment of the select agent rules led to the destruction of several
microbial collections (2) and is almost certainly interfering with
the establishment of new collections or saving of new clinical iso-
lates, given the enormous work involved in having such isolates
transferredtosecurefacilities.Furthermore,thefocusoncontain-
ing microbial threats by generating lists of organisms for special
consideration may have created a false sense of security while
greatly increasing the regulatory burden (3).
We are very fortunate that 10 years have passed with no addi-
tional bioterrorism events. This is a testament to the effort of
scientistsbehavingresponsiblyandworkingtogetherwiththena-
tional security community to minimize the risks. While ideally,
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® mbio.asm.org 1one would like to reduce the risk to zero, living in the real world,
we know that zero risk would mean little progress and that an
impaired research enterprise will leave us more vulnerable. Our
nation was built by, and has thrived on the efforts of, risk takers.
Thecurrentoversightsystemforlifescienceresearchisfunctional
and robust, ensuring that the pace to discovery is limited only by
intellectual and ﬁscal resources.
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